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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action by the heirs at law of Ellen
Scorup Frandsen, deceased, to set aside a sale of
property made by defendant, Edith S. Clinger, as
Executrix in said estate, which sale was confirmed
by order of court dated October 19, 1951.

Dit:>POS1 TION IN LOWER COURT
'l'ne court tooK under advisement defendants'
1Vlot10n tor
Judgment based on the
ground the statutes of limitat10n had barred plaintiffs' action, and proceeded to take evidence pertaining only to the proprity of the sale. The court
continued the hearing with reference to the questions of accounting and damages. At the conclusion of the evidence the court granted defendants'
motion and entered a summary judgment. (R. 29,
30) Plaintiffs' second cause of action was disposed
of by the parties in open court and dismissed by order of the triai court upon plaintiffs' motion. (Tr.
p. 97 L 23-26)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants seek to have the summary judgment affirmed, or that failing, to have the action
dismissed on one or more of the grounds as herein
set forth.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents generally agree with the statement of facts as set forth in the appellants' brief,
except as the same are hereby added to, modified,
set forth, and explained.
The one-half undivided interest in the property,
the sale of which by the Executrix is complained of
herein, originally came to the deceased and the
Executrix through their father, except for the vacant lot. The father left an undivided one-fourth
interest in said property to each of his four chil2

dren, Ellen Scorup Frandsen, the decedent herein;
Ruth S. Clegg; defendant, Edith S. Clinger, and
James M. Scorup. The deceased, Ellen Scorup
Frandsen, and the defendant, Edith S. Clinger, acquired the interests of their sister, Ruth, and brother, James, prior to the decedent's death. They
bought Ruth out early in the 1930's and acquired
James' interest between 1945 and 1950. The vacant
lot in Salina came to the deceased and the defendant, Edith S. Clinger, in undivided equal shares
from their grandmother. (Tr. p. 37-39) For several
years prior to the deceased's death, the sisters,
Ellen and Edith, each owned an undivided one-half
interest in the property, and leased the farm property for which they were paid rent in the form of
one-half of the crops. They then sold the crops as
they received them and split the money equally.
(Tr. p. 44 L 18) Later they leased the farm for
$400.00 cash rental per year, each receiving half,
and they paid the taxes. (Tr. p. 45, 46)
The file in Probate Case No. 10007 shows that the
notice dated October 8, 1951, of the hearing on the
Executrix's petition to confirm the sale of the estate's undivided one-half interest to her husband,
Herschel J. Clinger, was given to all interested
parties including the two minor children and their
father, Calvin E. Frandsen, who was present in
court by and through his attorny, I.E. Brockbank,
at the hearing on said petition on October 19, 1951,
as disclosed by the minutes of the court. (R. p. 42;
p. 49)
Calvin E. Frandsen claimed a one-third courtesy
3

i1!-terest in said property being sold. He had prev10usly requested from the Executrix funds from
the estate to the extent of his courtesy interest. He
had even attempted to find purchasers for the undivided one-half interest in the property among the
farmers in Salina. (Tr. p. 93 L 4-14)
Contrary to the contention made by appellants,
that the court, at the time of the hearing on the confirmation of the sale of the real property, was not
informed of the facts pertaining to the sale and
relationship of the purchaser to the Executrix, the
record discloses just the opposite. In this connection it goes without saying that Calvin E. Frandsen
knew the purchaser, Herschel J. Clinger, his brother-in-law, was the husband of the Executrix. The
contract of sale was attached to the Petition for
Confirmation and bears the clerk's filing stamp
dated October 6, 1951, and was before the court and
disclosed the buyer, Herschel J. Clinger, had the
same surname as that of the Executrix. At the time
of the hearing the attorney for the Executrix was
sworn and testified. The contract of sale to Herschel J. Clinger was offered and received in evidence. (R. p. 42; R. p. 49) The court, at the time of
the hearing, was ful!y advised that Herschel J.
Clinger, the buyer of the estate's undivided one-half
interest in the property, was the husband of the
Executrix, who also owned an undivided one-half
interest in the property. This was explained to the
court at the confirmation hearing by the attorney
for the Executrix. (Tr. p. 93 L 17; Tr. 94 L 13-19)
Bids were called for by the court and none being
received, the court ordered the sale of the undivided
4

one-half interest in the property to Herschel J.
Clinger as prayed for. (R. p. 42; R. p. 49)
The record, therefore, affirmatively shows, contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, that there was no
fraud or self-dealing on the part of the Executrix,
or a withholding from the court of any facts pertaining to the sale,
between the Executrix and the purchaser, and the fact the Executrix
owned an undivided one-half interest in the property sold. This is conclusively supported by the Order of Confirmation wherein the court found the
sale was legally made and fairly conducted; that
said sale was to the advantage of the estate and the
persons interested therein ; that the sum bid, being
the appraised value, was not disproportionate to
the value of the property sold. Then, too, the Executrix had no intent at any time to conceal any facts
from the c0urt regardjng ownership of the property
sold and her interest therein. She acted throughout
this entire transaction on the advice of her attorney. (Tr. p. 95 L 19-26)
At the same time the minors' father had, since
the death of their mother, actual custody of said
minor children and continued to have up until they
married or reached their majority. (Tr. p. 78 L 24;
Tr. p. 79L14; p. 82 L 20-21)
On February 6, 1953, Calvin E. Frandsen, father
of said minors, was, by order of the court, duly and
regularly apuointed their general guardian in Probate Case No. 10534, notwithstanding decedent's
Will designated the Executrix to act as guardian.
He remained such guardian throughout all of the
5

proceedings herein, and has never filed his accounting the:rein or been discharged as such guardian by
any order of the court.
Probate File No. 10007 shows that Calvin E.
Frandsen, father and legal guardian of said minors,
in the numerous accountings of Edith S. Clinger,
both as the Executrix and as the trustee, received
substantial payments over the years for the care,
support and maintenance of the minor children.
The probate file also shows that he and the minor
children, together with all interested persons, received notice of each and every proceeding in the
estate, including sixteen annual accountigs,
petitions for confirmation of sales, and the petitions for partial and final distribution.

all

With respect to the powers of the Executrix, the
Will provides as follows:
"7. ( e) My Executrix shall exercise, without limitation, the same full rights with respect to any
property in trust, as I might have exercised had I
survived and continued to be the owner of said
property." (Probate File No. 10007)

On October 19, 1951, the court in confirming the
sale, recited in the Order of Confirmation, among
other things, the following:
" ..... and it further appearing to the court that
the Executrix has sold the real and personal property hereinafter listed and described to the persons
hereinafter named, subject to confirmation by the
court, for the sums and on the terms hereinafter
stated, such sums being the highest and best bids
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therefor; that there are good reasons for the sales
on the grounds stated in said petition; that it is to
the advantage of the estate and persons interested
therein to sell said property for the reasons, among
others, that substantial sums of money will be required to repair th8 buildings on the described
lands, without any commensurate return of income;
that the income from rentals on said property is uncertain; that greater net returns from the investment can be made by loaning the equivalent amount
on good security at interest; and that the title to
the Sevier County property is complicated by being
held as a tenancy in common with another person;
that
sales were private sales, made without
notice; that such sales were legally made and fairly conducted; that the sums bid are not disproportionate to the value of the property sold; that sums
exceeding the bids for the respective properties at
least ten per cent, exclusive of the expenses of a
new sale, cannot be obtained; that the various properties have been appraised within one year from
the date of the sales, and that the sales prices for
each item of property are equal to or greater than
the appraised value thereof ..... "

Since the confirmation of the sale complained of,
the defendant Executrix and trustee has filed sixteen annual accountings, and also a final account
and petition for final distribution and for discharge of Executrix. One-half of the estate was distributed to the oldest child, Cheryl, by order of the
court on September 30, 1965, and at that time her
share in the estate amounted to $32,946.44. The
other one-half, amounting to $32,604.97, was distrib7

uted to Elizabeth, the youngest child, pursuant to
the cou:ct's order dated November 22, 1967. The
court exonerated and discharged the Executrix and
trustee from all further liability in the matter at
the time of entering the final order of distribution
on November 22, 1967.
Piaintiffs claim they did not know their mother's
one-half interest in the real property was sold to
their uncle, Herschel J. Clinger, until approximately one month prior to the filing of this suit on
January 7, 1970, when so advised by their attorney
herein. Yet it must be conceded, and the record
shows their father and guardian and his attorney,
I. E. Brockbank, and their aunt, Ruth S. Clegg, and
uncle, James M. Scorup, all interested parties in
this estate, knew about the sale of decedent's onehalf interest in the property, which was also reflected in the Executrix's accounts; then too,
Cheryl Frandsen, the eldest minor, admitted receiving notices of the hearings on the Executrix's
accounts and to occasionally attending the court
hearigs on the accounts. She even admits going to
the County Clerk's office and examining the probate file herein urior to and after she reached her
majority. (Tr. 83-84) She also admitted she talked about her mother's estate "lots of times" to her
Aunt Ruth, formerly owner of a one-fourth interest
in the real prperty, which was acquired by her mother and the Executrix prior to her mother's death.

p:

The complaint in this matter seeking to set the
1951 sale to Herschel J. Clinger aside was filed by
the children on January 7, 1970, and at that time
8

they were 23 years and 21 years of age, respectively,
Cheryl having reached her majority exactly four
years, five months, and seven days prior thereto.
More than 18 years elapsed between the confirmation of the sale complained of and the filing of the
complaint in this action, and about 17 1-2 years has
elapsed since the plaintiffs' father, Calvin E. Frandsen, was appointed their general guardian in
Probate No. 10534. In the case of Cheryl, her full
share of the estate was distributed to her nearly
five years ago, and it has been nearly three years
since Eliz2-beth's share was distributed to her and
the estate finally closed. Elizabeth became of age
two years, five months and seven days before this
action was filed.
Defendants generally admit the allegations of
plaintiffs' complaint, except they assert plaintiffs'
action is barred by the running of the statute of
limitations; that under the facts in this case there
was no fraudulant self-dealing on the part of the
Executrix either alleged or proven by the plaintiffs; that the sale being confirmed by the co?rt
with full knowledge of all the facts surroundmg
the same did not violate Section 75-10-6 as claimed
by the plaintiffs; that in any event, the plaintiffs'
action is further barred by latches, estoppel, and
res judicata as affirmatively pleaded by the defendants herein.
The trial court did not err in granting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The more fundamental proposition urged by defendants' is that the plaintiffs' First Cause of Ac9

tion, as a matter of law, fails to state a claim
against the defendants, or eiher of them upon
which relief can be granted for the
set
forth and discussed in defendants' Point V herein.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS IS BARRED BY UTAH STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS,
78-12-19.
The record discloses that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this regard, and that
defendants, therefore, under Rule 56 (b) are entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law.
The action of plaintiff, Cheryl Frandsen Griffiths, is barred by Section 78-12-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which provides as follows:
"No action for the recovery of any estate sold by
an Executor or Administrator in the course of any
probate proceedings can be maintained by any heir
or other person claiming under the decedent, unless
it is commenced within three years next after such
sale ..... "

More than four years having elapsed from the
time Cheryl reached her majority until the action
was filed, she is clearly barred from any recovery
by the statute.
With respect to Elizabeth Frandsen Trinnaman,
about two and one-half years elapsed between the
time she reached her maiority until this action was
commenced, she is barred by the equitable principle
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of latches. Yeaton vs. Barnhart, 152 Pac. 1192
(Ore); Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Ed., p.
274-275
Under Utah law, the statute of limitations begins to run against a minor upon the appointment
of a guardian, Dignan vs. Nelson, 26 Utah 186, 72
Pac. 936.
In the case of Parr vs. Zion's First National
Bank, etal 13 Utah 2d. 404, 375 Pac. 2d 461, it is
stated approving the Dignan case on page 407 in
the Utah Report as follows:
"In Dignan vs. Nelson, this court held that where

the statute of limitations has run against a guardian, the minor heirs are likewise barred, just as we
have held that when the Administrator was barred,
the minor heirs of decedent were barred, and for
the same reasons." Jenkins vs. Jensen, 24 Utah 108,
66 Pac. 773

A general guardian for the two plaintiffs having
been appointed by this court on February 6, 1953,
more than 17 1-2 years prior to the commencement
of this action, Section 78-12-19, above cited, is controlling, and the action of both plaintiffs is barred
thereby.
The cases indicate that while the heirs are barred
by the statute from claiming against the Executrix,
they could conceivably have a cause of action
against their guardian, particularly since he had
every conceivable notice of the proceedings in the
probate matter, and claimed courtesy as against
the property involved in the law suit, yet failed to
11

make any claim on his wards' behalf over a period
of more than fifteen years after the sale complained of in this lawsuit. Jenkins vs. Jensen, 24 Utah
108, 66 Pac. 773; Dignan vs. Nelson, Supra, on page
938.
The two cases relied on by the trial court in support of granting summary judgment hold where
the guardian has possession or the right to possession of the minor'sproperty the running of the statute of limitations against a guardian runs against
the minors. In the instant case the guardian had
the right to possession from the date of his appointment. No useful purpose is served further answering plaintiffs' Point III.
POINT II
THE ORDER CONFIRMING THE SALE
THE REAL PROPERTY COMPLAINED
HEREIN IS CONCLUSIVE, AND MAY NOT
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN THE
STANT PROCEEDINGS.

OF
OF
BE
IN-

The record shows the probate court was fully advised with reference to all of the facts surrounding
the sale at the hearing on the Executrix's petition
for confirmation, including the relationship between the Executrix and the proposed purchaser,
and the fact the Executrix owned an undivided onehalf interest in said property.
The record further shows there was no fraudulent self-dealing as plaintiffs claim. In fact plaintiffs have not either alleged nor proven any fraud
or unfairness in connection with the sale. This is
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evidenced by the recitals in the court's order confirming the sale. The sale at most would only be
voidable and plaintiffs have not shown any legal or
equitable grounds to warrant the relief they are
now seeking herein. Delinger vs. Luton (Calif.) 219
p 2d 495

31 Am Jur 2d, page 196, paragraph 410 states:
"The decree of a probate court incident to the sale
of a decedent's prop8rty cannot be collaterally attacked where jurisdictional facts appear in the
record." Davis vs. Gains,. 104 U.S. 386, 26 L ed. 757;
Farley vs. Davis, (Wash.) 116 P 2d 263

Under Section 75-10-15 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, if the court finds the facts therein specified to exist at the hearing on the petition for confirmation it "must make an order confirming the

sale and directing conveyance to be executed. The
sale from that time is confirmed and valid . ...."
Yeaton vs. Barnhart, (Oregon) supra

The case of Haight vs. Pearson, 11 Utah 51 (1895)
cited by plaintiffs on page 9 of their brief is distinguishable on the facts from the case at bar and
the part of the opinion set out by plaintiffs in their
brief is merely dista. Then too, the defenses pleaded in the instant case were not pleaded or raised in
that case. In our view a sale in violation of Section
75-10-6 would only be voidable in view of the fact
said section does not declare such a sale would be
void, thus allowing equitable principles to be considered by the court with reference to the propriety
of the sale.
13

POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED TO NOW
QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE SALE
COlVIPLAINED OF HEREIN.
The acceptance by the plaintiffs of their respective shares of their mother's estate, Cheryl having
received hers by court decree on September 30, 1965,
and Elizabeth on November 22, 1967, after having
received notices of every proceeding in the estate,
both prior to and after reaching their majorities,
estops them to question the validity of the sale complained of, the proceeds from which sale having become a part of the estate distributed to them.
Browne vs. Coleman, 125 P. 278, (Oregon). (See annotation in 2 ALR 2d commencing at page 133, paragraph 47. The rule apples to minors after reaching
their majority. See also 2 ALR 2d commencing on
page 142. See also 31 Am Jur 2d p. 199, paragraph
419.)
Defendants, through inadvertance and mistake
did not specifically deny the sale violated Section
75-10-6 and therefore are not deemed to have admitted the same. The entire case proceeded on the basis
the sale did not violate said section directly or indirectly. Then too, such an allegation in plaintiffs'
complaint was a mere conclusion of law.
POINT IV
THE SALE COMPLAINED OF IS NOT VOIDABLE ABSENT A SHOWING OF FRAUD, ES14

PECIALLY WHERE AS HERE, THE TESTATOR GAVE POWER WITHOUT LIMITATION
TO THE EXECUTRIX IN HER WILL TO DEAL
WITH THE ESTATE PROPERTY KNOWING
THE EXECUTRIX OWNED AN INTEREST
THEREIN. THE SALE, THEREFORE, CAME
UNDER THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE SET
FORTH IN SECTION 75-10-6 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
The s2-le of the one-half interest in the property
by the Executrix in this case to her husband under
the circumstances existing at the time of the sale
in question is not voidable in any proceeding in the
absence of a showing of fraud. Crawford vs. Gray,
30 NE 885; 48 SW 2d 1078; Cox vs. Simmerman, 48
SW 2d 1078.
One of the recognized exceptions to the rule prohibiting a purchase by an executor for his own benefit of estate property is where the executor, in his
own right, has an interest in the property, and it is
sold fairly and under such circumstances as will
afford the best price. Warrick vs. Woodham, 11 So.
2d 150, 144 ALR 1223 at pages 1233-34, discusses the
exceptions to the
under a similar statute to
ours and holds as follows:
"This court, however, has recognized and sanctioned as an exception to this rule, a purchase made by
an executor or administrator of estate property,
provided such executor or administrator has an interest in the property and it is sold fairly and under
such circumstances as will afford the best price."
(citing cases)
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and confirmed a sale by the executor to his wife.
Hall vs. White, 109 SE 2d 516.
The plaintiffs citation from 31 Am Jur 2d on
page 10 of their brief acknowledges there are exceptions to the general rule therein discussed, and
some of these exceptions are mentioned on page 188
section 389 of said text herein set forth.
31 Am Jur 2d, page 188, paragraph 389, evidently

overlooked by opposing counsel, states the exceptions to the rule as follows:
"Among exceptions to the general rule that an
executor or administrator cannot purchase estate
property at his own sale are sales authorized by the
will, sales to a representative who has an interest in
the estate, where there is no unfairness in the sale,
and sales by an executor to his wife, where she is a
beneficiary under the will and there is no unfairness in the sale." 34 CJS 561-64; Cook vs. Whitehead, (Ala.) 51 So. 2d 885, note 17 and 18.

In the case before the court, the defendant, Edith
S. Clinger, owned the other one-half interest in the
property sold, she was given unlimited authority
over the property in the deceased's will, the purchase price paid for the property was the full appraised value thereof, and the sale was confirmed
by the court after notice and hearing. The sale thus
comes clearly within the generally recognized exceptions to the rule.
The doctrine of self-dealing by a trustee does not
apply where a testator knowinglyylaced
in a position which he knows might conflict with
16

the interests of the beneficiaries and gives his trustee power to act in that dual capacity. In Re Steele's
Estate, 103 A. 2d 409; In Re Flagg's Estate, 73 A.
2d 411. In this case the deceased obviously knew
that the trustee owned the other half of the property, and nevertheless, in her will, chose to specifically give the trustee as much power over the
trust portion as the deceased herself had, and thus
the self-dealing rule does not apply.
POINT V
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
FAILS TO ST ATE A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED.
Plaintiffs' action instituted to set aside the
Executrix's sale herein complained of is an equitable action. Plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege
either payment or tender of payment of the amount
of the purchase price paid for the property to defendants, and particularly to the defendant Herschel J. Cinger. The failure of such an allegation
is fatal to plaintiffs' action for it shows no disposition on the part of the one who seeks equity to do
equity. Then too, there was no evidence produced
at the trial that plaintiffs had, prior to the filing
of their action herein, payed or tendered payment
of the amount of the purchase price for said property to defendant, Herschel J. Clinger, or the
Executrix.
A long line of California appellate decisions have
uniformly followed the weight of authority uphold-
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ing the principle, even in cases where the conduct
relied upon for relief has involved fraud, breaches
of fiduciary obligations, and failure to comply with
statutory requirements.
In an early decision on the subject the Supreme
Court of California said:
" ..... it is apparent from the general tenor of the
decisions that an action to set aside the sale, unaccompanied by an offer to redeem, would not state a
cause of action which a court of equity would recognize." Copsey vs. Sacramento Bank, 133 Cal. 659,
662, 66 P. 7

In Carpenter vs. Hamilton, 59 Cal. App. 2d 149;
138 P 2d 355, 356, the court, after citing the maxim
that "He who seeks equity must do equity" added
(at page 151): "This maxim has been crystallized
in California into this rule:
"A judicial sale will not be set aside in equity at
the instance of a beneficiary unless he ( 1) has paid
the obligation for the satisfaction of which the sale
took place, or (2) offers to do equity by paying the
obligation he has incurred. (Citations)"

To like effect is the more recent case of Crammer
vs. Whitehead, 230 Cal. App. 2d 264, 268; ------------------·
CONCLUSION
From the above and foregoing authorities based ,
on the facts of record herein, the summary judgment entered by the trial court should be affirmed;
that failing, this court has all the evidence before ,
18

it pertaining to the issues concerning the propriety
of the Executrix's sale herein complained of. In
view of this state of the record, we perceive no need
to remand the case to the trial court for trial of
such issues as tendered by the pleadings. The opinion of this court on the issue of the propriety of the
sale can serve as findings in favor of these defendants on that issue, and the trial court directed to
enter judgment in favor of defendants, dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint with costs awarded to defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON
J. Robert Bullock
Howard D. Hanson
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